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Executive Summary 
 
There has been a large increase in the number of workers receiving Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DI) over the last quarter century. While most of this increase is explained by well-known 
demographic factors, such as the growing number of women in the workforce and the aging of the 
baby boomers, there is considerable concern that workers are increasingly choosing to collect DI 
benefits as an alternative to working. This concern has figured prominently in the debate over plans 
to maintain full funding for the DI program beyond the projected DI trust fund depletion date in 
late 2016.1 2 
 
This paper examines the extent to which cuts in state workers’ compensation (WC) benefits may 
have contributed to the rise in DI awards. To some extent, these programs may be seen as 
alternative sources of support for workers with job-related injuries. Insofar as injured workers are 
less able to receive WC benefits, they may be more likely to turn to the DI program.  
 
At the national level, there is a clear correlation between the sharp decline in WC benefits over the 
last quarter century and the rise in DI benefits. This paper examines whether there could be a causal 
relationship between the reduction in WC benefits and the rise in DI benefits by examining state-
level data. 
 
It finds: 
 
 In a variety of specifications, there is a strong relationship between the decline in state-level 
WC beneficiaries and rise in new DI awards. This suggests that people are turning to DI 
because they are less able to collect WC benefits. 
 
 A test of whether the rise in DI awards by state can be explained by policy changes to the 
state WC program found some evidence of a relationship. Given the difficulties in capturing 
the policy changes in the relevant variable, this is strongly suggestive that the rise in DI 
benefits was in part the result of state-level policy decisions to make WC programs less 
generous.  
                                                 
1  Autor and Duggan (2006). 
2  Liebman (2015). 
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 These estimates suggest that more than one-fifth of the rise in the number of workers 
receiving DI awards can be explained by cuts to WC programs. 
 
These results are preliminary. We expect to conduct further tests of the relationship between WC 
and the DI program, but the results in this analysis strongly suggest that cuts in the former have led 
to increases in the latter.  
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Introduction 
 
The rising incidence and cost of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program over the last 
quarter century has been a major concern in national policy debate. The number of beneficiaries has 
gone from 25 per thousand workers in 1990 to 59 per thousand workers in 2014.3 As a result of this 
sharp rise, the DI trust fund is now facing depletion, with the most recent projections showing that 
incoming revenue and existing reserves will be not be sufficient to pay full benefits through the end 
of 2016.4 If Congress doesn’t act by that point, automatic benefit reductions will go into effect upon 
depletion of the trust fund. 
 
There has been considerable debate over the causes of the increase in disability rates. Three factors 
clearly explain much of the rise: 
 
 The aging of the population. Between 1980 and 2010, the share of the population aged 45 to 64 
increased from 19.6 to 26.4 percent.5 This can affect DI take-up rates because rates of 
disability increase with age.6  
 
 Women entering the workforce. As shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, women’s employment 
has increased substantially over the last fifty years. In 1967, just 45.2 percent of all women 
aged 30 to 64 were employed. By 2013, that figure had risen to 65.8 percent. This is 
important for two reasons. First, the increased rate of employment for women led to an 
increase in the share of the population eligible for DI benefits. Second, women have higher 
overall disability rates than men, and employed women end up taking DI at higher rates.7  
 
 Increasing the retirement age. Between December 2002 and January 2009, the age to receive full 
Social Security retirement benefits — often referred to as the “full retirement age” — 
                                                 
3  See “The 2015 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and  
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds” at: http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/tr/2015/tr2015.pdf, Table V.C5, page 137.  
4  See “A Summary of the 2015 Annual Reports” at: http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html. 
5  Howden and Meyer (2010), p. 6. 
6  See Reno (2011) pp. 4–5, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2015), O’Leary et al. (2012), and Guo and Burton (2012) for 
greater discussion. 
7  See Reno (2011) p. 1, Reville and Schoeni (2005), Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2015), O’Leary et al. (2012), and Guo 
and Burton (2012) for greater discussion. 
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gradually increased from 65 years to 66 years.8 As a result, people who would have been 
shifted from DI benefits to Social Security retirement benefits at age 65 remain on DI for an 
additional year. As of December 2010, there were over 300,000 DI beneficiaries who fell 
into this category.9 Full retirement age will remain at 66 through 2020, then will increase to 
67 years by 2027.10 11   
 
Other factors that have been linked to the overall rate of DI take-up are health insurance coverage 
and the weakness of the labor market. Virginia P. Reno, then Vice President for Income Security 
Policy at the National Academy of Social Insurance, stated in testimony before Congress: “Without 
health coverage, workers are at risk of missing care that could prevent or delay the onset of 
conditions that lead to work incapacity.” 12 It could also be the case that, when faced with the 
prospect of remaining uninsured for a long period of time, more disabled workers apply for DI 
benefits because they would like to receive Medicare coverage in the future.13 High unemployment 
has also been linked to the percentage of the eligible population applying for DI benefits; however, 
because the approval rate for DI tends to fall when more workers apply, the increase in approved 
awards stemming from a weak economy is less than proportional to the increase in applications.14 
The link between DI and the strength of the economy likely explains much of the increase in DI 
awards in 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
 
In addition to these factors, one often overlooked item that explains part of the increase in the share 
of eligible workers getting disability payments is the reduced mortality rates among workers 
collecting DI. In 1991, there were 46 deaths per thousand worker DI beneficiaries. By 2014, that 
rate had fallen to 28 deaths per thousand.15  
 
One topic that hasn’t been explored to any significant degree is the link between workers’ 
compensation (WC) and DI. There has been a sharp drop in the percentage of the workforce 
receiving WC benefits over the last quarter century. This is a matter of deliberate policy, as most 
states have tightened eligibility requirements and also reduced the generosity of WC benefits. It is 
reasonable to believe that a portion of the workers who might have been receiving WC under the 
                                                 
8  See “Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age” provided by the Social Security Administration, available at: 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/retirechart.html.  
9  Reno (2011), pp. 4–5. 
10  See “Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age” provided by the Social Security Administration, available at: 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/retirechart.html. 
11  See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2015), Guo and Burton (2012), and Reno (2011) for greater discussion. 
12  Reno (2011), p. 5. 
13  Workers receiving disability are eligible to receive Medicare after 29 months from time of approval. See Table A2 in the Appendix 
for more information. 
14  Goss et al. (2013), Rupp (2012). 
15  Zayatz (2015), p. 23. 
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rules in place in 1990, but who are excluded under current rules, may be turning to DI as an 
alternative. 
 
While these programs are related, there are important differences. WC only covers injuries incurred 
on the job, as opposed to disability more generally. WC pays workers’ medical costs in the event of 
an injury and provides them with income benefits if they miss work or are injured in such a way as 
to diminish their earnings capacity. Table A2 in the Appendix gives a brief comparison of these 
programs. From a policy perspective, there are three notable issues. First, although all the pertinent 
rules and regulations relating to WC benefits — including the level of benefits, the types of injuries 
for which workers can receive benefits, the duration of benefits, the reimbursement rates for various 
medical treatments, etc. — are determined by state governments, WC is often directly run by private 
companies. This means that if states tighten WC eligibility rules to exclude disabled workers from 
WC, they are effectively transferring costs from these companies to the federal government. Second, 
WC fees are experience-rated. The point is that more dangerous workplaces are expected to pay 
higher fees to compensate for the greater risk to their employees. If workers suffering from 
workplace-related injuries are instead covered by DI, employers providing less safe workplaces are 
effectively transferring the cost of this risk to the larger public. The third issue is that insofar as 
tighter WC rules are a factor in rising DI rolls, this means that less of the rise needs to be explained 
by a change in worker behavior. 
 
In addition to the possibility that workers who would have otherwise been eligible for WC turn to 
DI as an alternative, there is a second even more direct reason to expect a trade-off in spending 
between the two programs. The relationship between the two is governed by a federal “offset” 
provision. Under this provision, an injured or disabled worker may receive both DI and WC benefits 
at the same time, but the total compensation from the two programs may not exceed 80 percent of 
the worker’s pre-injury wage.16 In most states, once this 80 percent cap is hit, the worker’s DI 
benefits are reduced. In 15 states, a worker’s WC benefits are reduced.17 This means that if a state 
cuts its WC benefits by a certain amount, DI benefits paid to the worker will increase by the same 
amount.18 In some instances, cuts in WC benefits translate to nearly 1-for-1 increases in DI benefits 
for workers being assisted by both programs.19 
  
                                                 
16  Lockhart (2005), p. 1. 
17  National Academy of Social Insurance (2014), O’Leary et al. (2012), Reno, Williams, and Sengupta (2005), pp. 5–6. In 1981, 
Congress determined that states could not pass laws to reduce WC benefits for workers receiving both DI and WC benefits. 
However, because 15 states already had laws that reduced WC benefits rather than DI benefits, certain states were exempt from 
this provision.  
18  There are certain exceptions to this rule, and they are discussed in Box A2 in the Appendix. 
19  Guo and Burton (2012). 
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Several papers have suggested an inverse relationship between spending on WC and DI.20 Sengupta, 
Reno, and Burton (2011) compared spending levels in the two programs and found a close inverse 
relationship as shown in Figure 1 below:  
 
FIGURE 1 
Social Security Disability Insurance and Workers’ Compensation Cash Benefits Per $100 of Wages, 1980–2009 
 
Source: Sengupta, Reno, and Burton (2011), p. 45. 
 
Guo and Burton (2012) find a statistically significant negative relationship between WC benefits and 
DI application rates. Guo and Burton (2012) draw their data from 46 states and use data from the 
years 1981 to 1999, restricting their analysis to WC benefits for disabled workers receiving 
Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) or Permanent Total Disability (PTD) benefits.21 Their variables 
for the generosity of WC benefits are expected benefits and compensability rules. The expected 
benefits variable measures the expected income benefits for workers receiving PPD or PTD 
benefits. The variable is comprehensive, taking account of the state minimum level of benefits, the 
maximum level of benefits, the state average weekly wage (SAWW), the wage replacement rate, the 
duration of benefits, and federal and state taxes. It is expressed as a percentage of the SAWW. The 
                                                 
20  E.g. Reno, Williams, and Sengupta (2005), p. 35, O’Leary et al. (2012), and the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2005), pp. 
36–37, and (2009), pp. 365–366. 
21  “Total” and “Partial” refer to the extent of disability. Total disabilities prevent workers from returning to work in a similar capacity 
as before the injury, while partial disabilities allow the worker to return to a similar job after treatment. The word “Permanent” 
does not mean that injured workers can receive benefits indefinitely, but rather that the injury is expected to inhibit the worker for a 
period of time greater than the state’s duration of “temporary” disability benefits, which often pay benefits for up to two years.  
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compensability rules variable measures the level of eligibility restrictions applied to each state’s WC 
program. Changes in both variables over time are found to have a negative correlation with changes 
in the number of DI applications. Even after controlling for state-level changes in unemployment, 
women’s share of employment, the DI acceptance ratio, the DI replacement rate, population age, 
and disability prevalence, along with year- and state-fixed effects, the authors find that changes in 
WC law account for 3 to 4 percent of the growth in DI applications during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
McInerney and Simon (2012) obtain a contrary result. Using data on all but five states from 1986 to 
2001, they examine whether increases in maximum weekly PPD benefits are associated with more 
people taking WC PPD benefits, and whether or not that in turn affects the number of DI awards 
issued in the state. They note that on average only 28 percent of all workers qualify for their state’s 
maximum level of benefits in a given year.22 While the authors find a slight positive relationship 
between maximum weekly PPD benefits and the number of workers receiving PPD benefits, they 
do not find an effect on the number of DI awards.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
In this analysis, we compare how changes in the number of people receiving WC benefits affect 
changes in the number of new DI awards. It should be noted that this approach understates the 
effect of WC on DI spending because it fails to account for any increases in DI spending that may be 
attributed to the 80 percent offset. In 2013, of the 8.9 million workers receiving DI benefits, 
approximately 1.1 million were “dual eligible” for both WC and DI in 2013 or earlier.23 Of these 
“dual eligibles,” only 321,079 did not have their benefits reduced by the 80 percent cap, though 
another 88,546 dual eligibles were awaiting decisions on their WC cases.24 Of the remaining 
beneficiaries, 82,543 had their DI benefits reduced in 2013, 43,817 had their WC benefits reduced in 
2013, and 549,802 had had their total benefits reduced in a previous year.25 
 
This analysis compares year-over-year changes in the number of WC beneficiaries with changes in 
the number of DI awards. Because our analysis looks at the effect of workers’ compensation on DI 
awards, we limit our investigation to DI awards received by injured workers rather than the workers’ 
spouses or children. This provision isn’t unduly restrictive: as of 2014, of the roughly 10.9 million 
                                                 
22  McInerney and Simon (2012), p. 68. 
23  Sengupta and Baldwin (2015), p. 47. 
24  Sengupta and Baldwin (2015), p. 47. 
25  Sengupta and Baldwin (2015), p. 47. 
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DI beneficiaries, approximately 9.0 million were injured workers (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
Moreover, injured workers account for a disproportionate share of spending since benefits for 
disabled workers are much higher than for other persons receiving DI benefits (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix). 
 
The number of workers annually being awarded DI climbed from a trough of 297,000 in 1982 to a 
peak of over 1 million in 2010. Since 2010, the number of awards has declined somewhat, falling to 
869,000 in 2013 (see Figure A2 in the Appendix).  
 
It should be noted that this increase appears less substantial when we account for the factors 
discussed in the Introduction. While the number of injured workers receiving DI has risen 
substantially, the percentage of covered workers taking DI hasn’t increased to the same degree; this 
can be seen in Figure A3 in the Appendix. Had the number of workers covered by DI stayed 
constant from 1982 to 2013 — a proposition that discounts population growth and rising rates of 
employment — the number of annual DI awards would have gone up by 298 thousand rather than 
578 thousand. This means that population growth and higher employment alone account for about 
half the growth in the number of DI awards. This trend is depicted in Figure A4. 
 
Moreover, while the DI take-up rate has risen over the past quarter-century, the age- and sex-adjusted 
take-up rate for disability has actually declined over this period.26 While the unadjusted DI take-up 
rate has risen by 1.12 awards per 1,000 covered workers since 1991, the age- and sex-adjusted data 
show that the take-up rate fell by 0.44 awards.27 (See Figure A5 in the Appendix.) Because the take-
up rates fluctuate somewhat from year to year, we also present four-year moving averages of the 
take-up rates in Figure A6 in the Appendix. Using four-year averages, between 1991 to 1994 and 
2011 to 2014, the gross DI take-up rate rose by 1.42 awards per 1,000 covered workers, while the 
age- and sex-adjusted rate declined by 0.16 awards.  
 
These data indicate that there is no surge in DI awards that needs to be explained. Nonetheless, DI 
awards may still be higher than would otherwise have been the case without cuts in WC over this 
period. 
 
To determine the relationship between WC and DI, we draw data from three sources: the Annual 
Statistical Bulletin published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI); various 
                                                 
26  This measure shows what the DI take-up rate would have been if the workforce had the same age and gender profile as it did in 
2000. 
27  A modified version of Figure A4 that starts from the year 1991 is presented as Figure A7 in the Appendix so as to give 
researchers a constant point of comparison with Figures A5 and A6. Between 1991 and 2014, the number of new DI awards rose 
by 333,000, though it would only have risen by 172,000 without any increase in the number of covered workers. 
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reports published by the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI);28 and the Annual Statistical 
Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program published by the Social Security Administration. 
NCCI’s Annual Statistical Bulletin provides data, by state, on the number of WC beneficiaries per 
100,000 covered workers. By combining NCCI’s data with NASI’s data on the number of covered 
workers,29 we are able to determine the number of WC beneficiaries in each state in any given year. 
Because NCCI’s data do not cover North Dakota, Ohio, Washington (state), West Virginia, and 
Wyoming, our estimates on the number of WC beneficiaries cover 45 states and the District of 
Columbia (DC). (We will henceforth refer to these 45 states and DC as “46 states.”) The Social 
Security Administration’s state-level data on the number of new DI awards go back to 2001; the 
most recent NCCI data include figures from 2011. As such, our analysis includes data from 46 states 
for the years 2001 to 2011, as well as from Arkansas, Montana, and South Dakota for 2012. The 
number of WC beneficiaries in these 46 states has declined dramatically over the past decade, from 
approximately 6.5 million in 2001 to just over 4 million in 2011. As shown in Figure 2 the number 
of WC beneficiaries has fallen at the same time as the number of new DI awards in these 46 states 
has risen.30  
 
FIGURE 2 
The Fall of Workers’ Compensation and the Rise of Disability Insurance 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and National Council on Compensation Insurance (2015); National Academy of Social 
Insurance (2015); Social Security Administration (2014). 
                                                 
28  These are NASI’s annual reports on WC programs, titled “Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs.” These 
reports are cited as National Academy of Social Insurance (2015). 
29  This is different than the methodology employed by McInerney and Simon (2012), who use NCCI’s data on the number of 
beneficiaries per 100,000 covered workers without adjusting for changes in coverage rates. As such, any declines in the number of 
WC beneficiaries that can be attributed to declining coverage won’t show up in their data. 
30  The number of DI awards in these 46 states rose from a little over 600,000 in 2001 to over 900,000 in 2011. 
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Furthermore, if we examine year-over-year changes in the number of WC recipients versus the 
number of DI awards, it appears that greater declines in the number of WC beneficiaries correlate 
with greater increases in DI awards as shown in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Larger Drops In Workers' Compensation Associated With Increased Disability Insurance Awards 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and National Council on Compensation Insurance (2015); National Academy of Social 
Insurance (2015); Social Security Administration (2014). 
 
To determine whether changes in the number of WC beneficiaries affect the number of DI awards, 
we consider percent changes in both variables from the previous year, by state. Because these 
variables require a previous year’s data, they exclude 2001; this leaves us with percent changes for 46 
states from 2002 to 2011, as well as changes in three states in 2012, giving us a total of 463 
observations. Descriptive statistics for both variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
  WC Changes DI Changes 
Mean -0.04336 0.04520 
Standard Deviation 0.04756 0.09913 
Count 463 463 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Our first model simply consists of a regression comparing the percent changes in WC beneficiaries 
to the percent changes in DI awards. The variable “WC Changes” — which measures the percent 
change in WC beneficiaries from the previous year — is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
of confidence. The results indicate that a 1 percent decrease in WC beneficiaries increases the 
number of DI awards by 0.58 percent, as shown in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
Changes in Disability Awards and Changes in Numbers Receiving Workers’ Compensation 
(Dependent Variable: Changes in Disability Insurance Awards) 
  Coefficient Standard Error t statistic p-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
99% 
Upper 
99% 
Intercept* 0.02024 0.00600 3.37290 0.00081 0.00845 0.03204 0.00472 0.03577 
WC 
Changes* -0.57553 0.09331 -6.16819 0.00000 -0.75889 -0.39217 -0.81687 -0.33419 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Adjusted R2 = 0.07423. *Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. **Significant at 
the 5 percent level of confidence. ***Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
Our second model incorporates a trend control by adding dummy variables for year fixed effects. 
The coefficient for “WC Changes” decreases from 0.58 to 0.27, as can be seen in Table 3 below. 
This means that a 1 percent decrease in WC beneficiaries correlates with a 0.27 percent increase in 
DI awards. The variable is significant at the 5 percent level of confidence. This suggests that the 38 
percent decline in the number of WC beneficiaries from 2001 to 2011 was associated with a 10.2 
percent increase in the number of new DI awards. Given that there were approximately 604,000 DI 
awards in our 46 states in 2001, this would imply that the number of DI awards would increase by 
over 60,000 by 2011 as a result of the decline in WC. Since the number of DI awards actually 
increased by about 300,000, it seems that a bit over a fifth of the increase can be explained by cuts in 
WC programs.31  
 
To determine whether legislative changes to WC programs could have an effect on workers’ 
decisions on whether to take WC or DI, we researched the WC legislative changes in all 46 states 
from 2002 to 2011 (or 2012). We began this research by consulting the changes in WC law 
documented by ProPublica from 2002 to 2014.32 We also examined data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the websites of various state governments to account for any changes not documented 
by ProPublica. We found a small number of such changes. In order to determine the effective dates 
as well the importance of these changes, we then tracked down either the individual bills themselves 
or extra information on the bills. The given change was classified as a Significant Cut (in benefits), an 
Insignificant Cut, a Significant Increase, or an Insignificant Increase. 
                                                 
31  We expect to do further research on this link that will incorporate more variables so as to control for other factors that may be 
causing the increase in DI awards. 
32  Available at: http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-comp-reform-by-state?state.  
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TABLE 3 
Changes in Disability Awards and Changes in Numbers Receiving Workers’ Compensation 
(Dependent Variable: Changes in Disability Insurance Awards) 
  Coefficient Standard Error t statistic p-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
99% 
Upper 
99% 
Intercept* -0.03584 0.01301 -2.75422 0.00612 -0.06142 -0.01027 -0.06950 -0.00218 
WC 
Changes** -0.26666 0.11306 -2.35858 0.01877 -0.48884 -0.04447 -0.55911 0.02580 
2002* 0.13777 0.01927 7.15026 0.00000 0.09990 0.17563 0.08793 0.18761 
2003* 0.05432 0.01889 2.87639 0.00421 0.01721 0.09144 0.00547 0.10318 
2004* 0.06772 0.01842 3.67629 0.00027 0.03152 0.10392 0.02007 0.11536 
2005* 0.08398 0.01837 4.57201 0.00001 0.04788 0.12008 0.03647 0.13150 
2006 0.01434 0.01838 0.78022 0.43567 -0.02178 0.05046 -0.03320 0.06188 
2007** 0.03848 0.01863 2.06539 0.03946 0.00187 0.07510 -0.00971 0.08668 
2008* 0.08703 0.02099 4.14607 0.00004 0.04578 0.12828 0.03273 0.14133 
2009* 0.11519 0.02064 5.58046 0.00000 0.07462 0.15575 0.06179 0.16858 
2010* 0.09998 0.01834 5.45024 0.00000 0.06393 0.13602 0.05253 0.14743 
2012 0.00771 0.05247 0.14703 0.88318 -0.09540 0.11083 -0.12801 0.14344 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Adjusted R2 = 0.21298. *Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. **Significant at 
the 5 percent level of confidence. ***Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
To determine whether or not such changes had affected the number of workers receiving WC, we 
ran a regression comparing changes in the number of WC beneficiaries with changes in legislation. 
In all models, we indexed the number of workers receiving WC to 100 for the year 2001, and the 
number of workers receiving WC in a given year was thus expressed as a percentage of the number 
of workers who had received WC in 2001. We then created two indicator variables which showed 
whether states had significantly increased or decreased benefits in a given year. The indicator 
variable applied for all years after the change had taken effect. For instance, if a state first cut its WC 
benefits in 2007,33 2007 and all subsequent years (usually 2007 to 2011) had the indicator variable for 
“Cuts.” Because the number of WC beneficiaries has generally declined over time, we again add a 
trend control. Our results — which can be seen in Table 4 — show that legislative cuts to WC have 
resulted in fewer WC beneficiaries. This variable is significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
The coefficient for “Increases” is positive, as we would expect, but is not statistically significant. We 
therefore removed the “Increases” variable and re-ran our results, which can be seen in Table 5 on 
the next page. The results were similar to those seen in Table 4, though the “Cuts” variable achieved 
significance at the 5 percent level of confidence. (The absolute value of the “Cuts” coefficient also 
increased, though it was slight.) 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  If a cut or increase went into effect in the last four months of a given calendar year, we labeled the next year as the first year of 
the cut/increase. For example, if a legislative cut had gone into effect in December 2004, the year 2005 would have been 
identified as the year of the cut. 
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TABLE 4 
Changes in Disability Awards and Changes in Numbers Receiving Workers’ Compensation 
(Dependent Variable: Number of Workers Receiving WC Benefits, Indexed to 100 in 2001) 
  Coefficient Standard Error t statistic p-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
99% 
Upper 
99% 
Intercept* 64.54642 1.64535 39.22964 0.00000 61.31290 67.77994 60.29023 68.80260 
Cuts*** -2.30901 1.19274 -1.93589 0.05351 -4.65305 0.03502 -5.39440 0.77637 
Increases 1.48156 1.31852 1.12365 0.26176 -1.10966 4.07277 -1.92918 4.89230 
2002* 29.17524 2.21141 13.19306 0.00000 24.82927 33.52122 23.45477 34.89571 
2003* 24.51018 2.20255 11.12811 0.00000 20.18163 28.83874 18.81264 30.20773 
2004* 22.58396 2.17857 10.36639 0.00000 18.30252 26.86541 16.94843 28.21950 
2005* 21.15372 2.16369 9.77670 0.00000 16.90154 25.40591 15.55670 26.75074 
2006* 19.56169 2.14426 9.12282 0.00000 15.34769 23.77570 14.01492 25.10846 
2007* 16.32329 2.12925 7.66622 0.00000 12.13879 20.50780 10.81535 21.83123 
2008* 8.38983 2.11787 3.96146 0.00009 4.22770 12.55197 2.91134 13.86833 
2009 1.46009 2.11364 0.69079 0.49005 -2.69374 5.61391 -4.00747 6.92764 
2010 0.51252 2.11300 0.24255 0.80846 -3.64006 4.66510 -4.95340 5.97844 
2012 -0.41166 6.05135 -0.06803 0.94579 -12.3041 11.48076 -16.0653 15.24197 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Adjusted R2 = 0.52001. *Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. **Significant at 
the 5 percent level of confidence. ***Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
TABLE 5 
Changes in Disability Awards and Changes in Numbers Receiving Workers’ Compensation 
(Dependent Variable: Number of Workers Receiving WC Benefits, Indexed to 100 in 2001) 
  Coefficient Standard Error t statistic p-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
99% 
Upper 
99% 
Intercept* 65.02644 1.58939 40.91294 0.00000 61.90292 68.14996 60.91506 69.13782 
Cuts** -2.37278 1.19174 -1.99102 0.04708 -4.71483 -0.03073 -5.45554 0.70998 
2002* 28.75964 2.18089 13.18709 0.00000 24.47367 33.04562 23.11816 34.40112 
2003* 24.15900 2.18089 11.07757 0.00000 19.87302 28.44497 18.51752 29.80048 
2004* 22.23832 2.15738 10.30804 0.00000 17.99856 26.47808 16.65767 27.81897 
2005* 20.81224 2.14286 9.71236 0.00000 16.60101 25.02347 15.26914 26.35534 
2006* 19.25796 2.12777 9.05076 0.00000 15.07638 23.43954 13.75389 24.76203 
2007* 16.11896 2.12209 7.59580 0.00000 11.94855 20.28936 10.62960 21.60832 
2008* 8.22464 2.11337 3.89171 0.00011 4.07136 12.37792 2.75782 13.69145 
2009 1.39151 2.11337 0.65843 0.51060 -2.76177 5.54479 -4.07530 6.85833 
2010 0.47615 2.11337 0.22530 0.82184 -3.67713 4.62943 -4.99066 5.94297 
2012 -0.84917 6.04057 -0.14058 0.88827 -12.7203 11.02199 -16.4748 14.77642 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Adjusted R2 = 0.51973. *Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. **Significant at 
the 5 percent level of confidence. ***Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
These regressions, in tandem, indicate that state-level cuts to WC programs have increased the 
number of injured workers taking DI. The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that cuts in 
WC law have decreased the number of workers receiving WC, and the results presented in Table 3 
indicate that decreases in the number of WC beneficiaries correspond with increases in DI awards. 
As such, it seems that legislative cuts to WC law have caused increases in the number of DI awards.  
 
As an additional check, we re-ran the regression presented in Table 5, but changed the dependent 
variable from the number of WC beneficiaries to the number of DI awards. In this scenario, the 
“Cuts” variable is expected to be positive, as legislative cuts to WC should cause increases in the 
 Rising Disability Payments: Are Cuts to Workers’ Compensation Part of the Story? 14 
 
number of DI awards. The results — presented in Table 6 below — indicate that cuts to WC have 
been associated with more DI awards. The “Cuts” variable is significant at the 10 percent level of 
confidence. 
 
TABLE 6 
Changes in Disability Awards and Changes in Numbers Receiving Workers’ Compensation 
(Dependent Variable: Number of DI Awards, Indexed to 100 in 2001) 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t statistic p-value 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
99% 
Upper 
99% 
Intercept* 150.15090 3.64256 41.22127 0.00000 142.99241 157.30939 140.72842 159.57338 
Cuts*** 4.72061 2.73123 1.72838 0.08460 -0.64691 10.08813 -2.34448 11.78569 
2002* -38.30117 4.99818 -7.66302 0.00000 -48.12378 -28.47856 -51.23033 -25.37201 
2003* -34.99832 4.99818 -7.00221 0.00000 -44.82093 -25.17571 -47.92748 -22.06916 
2004* -31.23672 4.94428 -6.31774 0.00000 -40.95341 -21.52003 -44.02647 -18.44698 
2005* -25.19704 4.91102 -5.13072 0.00000 -34.84836 -15.54572 -37.90073 -12.49335 
2006* -27.75153 4.87644 -5.69094 0.00000 -37.33489 -18.16817 -40.36578 -15.13729 
2007* -26.29715 4.86341 -5.40715 0.00000 -35.85491 -16.73940 -38.87769 -13.71662 
2008* -17.41744 4.84343 -3.59610 0.00036 -26.93594 -7.89895 -29.94631 -4.88858 
2009 -4.02055 4.84343 -0.83010 0.40692 -13.53905 5.49794 -16.54942 8.50831 
2010 5.58617 4.84343 1.15335 0.24938 -3.93233 15.10467 -6.94270 18.11504 
2012 15.99198 13.84380 1.15517 0.24863 -11.21439 43.19834 -19.81881 51.80276 
Source: Authors’ calculations. Adjusted R2 = 0.30119. *Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence. **Significant at 
the 5 percent level of confidence. ***Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
 
It should be noted that the results of the regressions presented in Tables 4 to 6 do not map onto 
questions of quantifiable increases in DI awards as easily as the results presented in Table 3. This is 
because our variable for “legislative cuts” does not perfectly quantify the degree of cuts to WC. Our 
results suggest that significant cuts in WC increase DI awards; however, more insignificant cuts may 
still have increased the incidence of DI awards, although each insignificant cut will, by itself, have 
only a small effect. Moreover, within the sphere of significant cuts, our variable does not 
differentiate between cuts we just barely deemed significant versus those that were even more 
significant. While we can say that legislative cuts to WC have led to increased DI awards, we cannot 
quantify the exact degree of increase. 
 
Our results are more in line with those of Guo and Burton (2012) than those of McInerney and 
Simon (2012). Just as Guo and Burton (2012) find that cuts to WC law are associated with increased 
DI applications, so we find that they are associated with increased DI awards. Our results do not 
necessarily contradict those of McInerney and Simon (2012). Their results indicate that legislated 
increases in maximum weekly PPD benefits don’t have an effect on DI awards, which is consistent 
with our own study not finding a statistically significant relationship between legislated increases in 
WC benefits and decreased DI awards. Nonetheless, it is telling that our two papers’ ultimate 
findings point in opposite directions. There are a number of plausible reasons why McInerney and 
Simon (2012) may have found results different from our own: they only examine increases in the 
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maximum level of weekly benefits (which only apply to a minority of all workers); they limit their 
analysis to only PPD beneficiaries; and they don’t differentiate between significant and insignificant 
legislative changes.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
These results indicate that policymakers and academics may have overlooked an important factor 
behind the rise in DI awards: state-level cuts to WC programs. While researchers have examined a 
number of factors behind the rise in DI, workers’ compensation has received very little attention in 
this discussion. The research presented in this paper indicates that workers are more likely to take 
DI benefits in part because they no longer have the option of taking WC benefits. One implication 
of the decision by many states to cut WC benefits was to transfer costs to the federal government 
through the DI program. This research suggests that cuts to the WC program may have been 
responsible for roughly one-fifth of the rise in DI awards over this period.  
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Appendix 
 
FIGURE A1 
Employment Rates, Ages 30 to 64 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey. 
 
TABLE A1 
Rules for DI Eligibility by Age 
Age Qualifying for DI Benefits: Work Credit Requirements 
Under 24 Must have earned six credits in the three years preceding the onset of disability. 
24 to 31 Must have earned an amount of credits consistent with the following formula:  
2 x ([Age at date of injury] - 21). For example, a worker who is 29 years old at the date of his injury must 
have earned 16 credits, because 2 x (29 - 21) = 16. Furthermore, these credits must have been earned 
after turning 21. 
31 to 42 Must have earned twenty credits in the 10 years preceding the onset of disability. 
42 to 62 Must have earned an amount of credits consistent with the following formula:  
20 + ([Age at date of injury] - 42). For example, a worker who is 56 years old at the date of her injury 
must have earned 34 credits, because 20 + (56 - 42) = 34. At least 20 of the credits must have been 
earned in the 10 years preceding the onset of disability. 
62 to 66 Must have earned 40 credits, 20 of which must have been earned in the 10 years preceding the onset of 
disability. 
Source: Authors’ compilation; information is from the Social Security Administration website, “Benefits Planner: Social 
Security Credits,” at http://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#&a0=2. Note: Blind workers are exempt from this 
system.34 
                                                 
34  See “Disability Planner: Special Rules For People Who Are Blind Or Have Low Vision,” at: 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/disability/dqualify8.html. 
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BOX A1 
Additional Requirements for Qualifying for DI Benefits 
There are two additional caveats worth noting: 
 
1. Workers over the age of 31 are required not only to have earned a certain number of credits, but also must 
have earned a certain amount of credits in the recent past. More specifically, any worker age 31 or over must have 
worked five out of the previous ten years in order to qualify for benefits. (See Social Security Disability Benefits, 
page 8, available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029.pdf.) 
 
2. The last age group presented in Table A1 is liable to change over time. This is because workers are shifted from 
receiving DI benefits to receiving OASI benefits when they hit Social Security’s full retirement age. In 2002, 
before the full retirement age was raised, the last age range would have been “62 to 65.” By 2027, it will be “62 
to 67.” The increase in Social Security’s OASI full retirement age has increased the costs of the DI program by 
forcing the DI program to cover workers over the age of 65. 
 
TABLE A2 
Rules and Eligibility: Workers’ Compensation and Disability Insurance 
 Workers’ Compensation Social Security Disability Insurance 
Injuries or Illnesses 
Covered 
Covers any injury that occurs at work 
and inhibits a worker’s earning capacity.  
Covers any medical condition that precludes 
gainful employment regardless of whether an 
injury occurred at work or not. 
Eligibility Workers are eligible for workers’ 
compensation benefits beginning with 
their first day of employment. 
See Table A1 and Box A1 above. 
Effect on benefits of 
duration of injury or 
disability 
Covers both short-term and long-term 
disabilities, with benefits being provided 
for a shorter duration if the disability 
impairs the worker for a shorter period 
of time. (Workers may not receive 
benefits to compensate their waiting 
periods, however.) 
Covers disabilities that are expected to prevent 
gainful employment for at least one year or result 
in death.  
Start date for receipt 
of benefits 
States have distinct waiting periods 
which prohibit workers from receiving 
income benefits for the first 3 to 7 days 
after the date of their injury, though 
medical benefits are available 
immediately. 
There is a five-month waiting period between 
when workers are approved for income benefits 
and when they can start receiving them.35 After 
the five-month waiting period is over, there is a 
separate 24-month waiting period before a 
worker can begin receiving Medicare.36 (This 
leads to a total 29-month waiting period after 
approval.) 
Source: Information from National Academy of Social Insurance (2014), EHealth (2012), O’Leary et al. (2012), Medicare 
Rights Center (2015), Social Security Administration (2015a), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2012), and 
Social Security Administration, various sources.37 
 
 
  
                                                 
35  EHealth (2012), National Academy of Social Insurance (2014), Medicare Rights Center (2015) 
36  Workers with End-Stage Renal Disease or Lou Gehrig’s Disease are exempt from the waiting period. 
37  See the following sources: 
 “Disability Planner: How We Decide If You Are Disabled.” at: 
http://www.ssa.gov/planners/disability/dqualify5.html#&a0=4. 
 “Benefits Planner: Social Security Credits.” at: http://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#&a0=0. 
 “Disability Planner: How Much Work Do You Need?” at: http://www.ssa.gov/planners/disability/dqualify2.html. 
 “Contribution and Benefit Rise.” at: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html. 
 “Disability Insurance Benefit Payments.” at: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4a6.html. 
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FIGURE A2 
Worker Disability Insurance Awards 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Social Security Administration (2014); Social Security Administration (2000). 
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BOX A2 
Disability Insurance-Workers’ Compensation Offset Scenarios 
When injured workers are receiving both DI and WC, their total income benefits from the two programs are capped at 
80 percent of the worker’s pre-injury wage. When states make cuts to their WC programs, there are four possible 
outcomes: 1) there is no change in benefits paid by either of the two programs; 2) the cuts in WC benefits translate to 
higher DI benefits; 3) the worker receives fewer benefits; or 4) a combination of points two and three, in which workers 
lose WC benefits and some but not all of their benefits are replaced under the DI program. The outcome depends on 
two factors: 1) whether the worker lives in a state that reduces his WC benefits or his DI benefits; and 2) how great his 
benefits would have been without the 80 percent cap. Five scenarios describing the four outcomes are given below. 
 
Scenario 1 
The worker’s pre-injury weekly wage is $500. He qualifies for WC benefits of up to $300 per week; he also qualifies for DI benefits of up to 
$300 per week. Because this worker lives in a state that reduces WC benefits rather than DI benefits, he receives $100 a week in WC 
benefits and $300 a week in DI benefits. 
The Cut: The state reduces its WC benefits from $300 per week to $250 per week. 
The Outcome: There is no change. The worker still receives $100 per week in WC benefits and $300 per week in DI 
benefits. 
 
Scenario 2 
The worker’s pre-injury weekly wage is $500. He qualifies for WC benefits of up to $300 per week; he also qualifies for DI benefits of up to 
$300 per week. Because this worker lives in a state that reduces DI benefits rather than WC benefits, he receives $300 a week in WC 
benefits and $100 a week in DI benefits. 
The Cut: The state reduces its WC benefits from $300 per week to $250 per week. 
The Outcome: The worker’s weekly WC benefits are reduced from $300 to $250, and his DI benefits increase from 
$100 to $150. As such, there is no reduction in benefits received by the worker, but there is a cost shift of $50 from the 
WC program to the DI program. 
 
Scenario 3 
The worker’s pre-injury weekly wage is $500. She qualifies for WC benefits of up to $220 per week; she also qualifies for DI benefits of up 
to $220 per week. Because this worker lives in a state that reduces WC benefits rather than DI benefits, she receives $180 a week in WC 
benefits and $220 a week in DI benefits. 
The Cut: The state reduces its WC benefits from $220 per week to $110 per week. 
The Outcome: The worker’s weekly WC benefits are reduced from $180 to $110. Because the worker was already 
previously receiving DI benefits of $220 per week, her DI benefits are unchanged. The worker’s total benefits fall from 
$400 per week to $330 per week, a cut of $70. 
 
Scenario 4 
The worker’s pre-injury weekly wage is $500. She qualifies for WC benefits of up to $220 per week; she also qualifies for DI benefits of up 
to $220 per week. Because this worker lives in a state that reduces DI benefits rather than WC benefits, she receives $220 a week in WC 
benefits and $180 a week in DI benefits. 
The Cut: The state reduces its WC benefits from $220 per week to $110 per week. 
The Outcome: The worker’s weekly WC benefits are reduced from $220 to $110. Because the worker may receive up to 
$220 a week in DI benefits, her DI benefits are increased by $40, from $180 per week to $220. As such, $40 in costs are 
shifted from the WC program to the DI program, and the worker loses $70 a week in total benefits. 
 
Scenario 5 
The worker’s combined WC and DI benefits add up to exactly 80 percent of the worker’s pre-injury wage. 
The Cut: Not relevant. 
The Outcome: Any cut in WC benefits translates to a cut in total benefits paid to the worker of the exact same amount. 
For example, if WC benefits are reduced by $100 per week, the worker receives $100 less in compensation. If WC 
benefits are reduced by $300, the worker receives $300 less in compensation.  
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TABLE A3 
Social Security Disability Insurance Beneficiaries and Benefits, 2014 (Most Recent Data) 
 Number of 
Beneficiaries 
(Thousands) 
Benefits 
Received 
(Millions) 
Average Annual 
Benefits Per 
Beneficiary 
Percent of Total 
Beneficiaries  
Percent of Total 
Benefits 
Received 
Workers 8,955 $132,154 $14,758 81.9 93.3 
Spouses 150 $598 $3,987 1.4 0.4 
Children 1,828 $8,870 $4,852 16.7 6.3 
All Groups 10,932 $141,622 $12,955 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations and “The 2015 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds,” pages 37 and 137, available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/tr/2015/tr2015.pdf. Note: The categories represent rounded values. 
 
FIGURE A3 
Social Security Disability Insurance Awards Per 1,000 Covered Workers 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Social Security Administration (2014); Social Security Administration (2000); Social 
Security Administration (2015). Note: The highlighted peaks, troughs, and start and end dates are 1965, 1975, 1982, 
1992, 2000, 2010, and 2013. 
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FIGURE A4 
Increase in the Number of Workers Receiving Social Security Disability Insurance Awards, Since 1982 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Social Security Administration (2014); Social Security Administration (2000); Social 
Security Administration (2015). 
 
FIGURE A5 
Social Security Disability Insurance Take-Up Rates, Per 1,000 Covered Workers 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations, Zayatz (2015). Note: There’s a slight discrepancy between the gross rates presented in 
Figure A5 and the rates presented in Figure A3. 
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FIGURE A6 
Social Security Disability Insurance Take-Up Rates, Per 1,000 Covered Workers, Four-Year Moving Averages 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations, Zayatz (2015). 
 
FIGURE A7 
Increase in the Number of Workers Receiving Social Security Disability Insurance Awards, Since 1991 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Social Security Administration (2014); Social Security Administration (2000); Social 
Security Administration (2015). 
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